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Abstract—Over the past years, political events and public
opinion on the Web have been allegedly manipulated by accounts
dedicated to spreading disinformation and performing malicious
activities on social media. These accounts hereafter referred
to as “Pathogenic Social Media (PSM)” accounts, are often
controlled by terrorist supporters, water armies or fake news
writers and hence can pose threats to social media and general
public. Understanding and analyzing PSMs could help social
media firms devise sophisticated and automated techniques that
could be deployed to stop them from reaching their audience and
consequently reduce their threat. In this paper, we leverage the
well-known statistical technique “Hawkes Process” to quantify
the influence of PSM accounts on the dissemination of malicious
information on social media platforms. Our findings on a real-
world ISIS-related dataset from Twitter indicate that PSMs are
significantly different from regular users in making a message
viral. Specifically, we observed that PSMs do not usually post
URLs from mainstream news sources. Instead, their tweets
usually receive large impact on audience, if contained URLs from
Facebook and alternative news outlets. In contrary, tweets posted
by regular users receive nearly equal impression regardless of the
posted URLs and their sources. Our findings can further shed
light on understanding and detecting PSM accounts.
Index Terms—Pathogenic Social Media Accounts, Malicious
Activity, Misinformation, Hawkes Processes
I. INTRODUCTION
Online social media play major role in dissemination of
information. However, recent years have witnessed evidence
of spreading huge amount of harmful disinformation on social
media and manipulating public opinion on the Web, attributed
to accounts dedicated to spreading malicious information.
These accounts are referred to “Pathogenic Social Media”
(PSM) accounts and can pose threats to social media firms
and general public. PSMs are usually controlled by terrorist
supporters, water armies or fake news writers and they are
owned by either real users or bots who seek to promote or
degrade certain ideas by utilizing large online communities
of supporters to reach their goals. Identifying PSM accounts
could have immediate applications, including countering ter-
rorism [1], [2], fake news detection [3], [4] and water armies
detection [5], [6].
To better understand the behavior and impact of PSM
accounts on the Web and normal users, and be able to counter
their malicious activity, social media authorities need to deploy
certain capabilities which could ultimately lead to reducing
their threats. To make this happen, social media platforms
are required to design sophisticated techniques that could
automatically detect and suspend these accounts as quickly as
possible, before they can reach their vast audience and spread
malicious content. However, for the most part, the social media
firms usually rely on reports they receive from their normal
users or even their assigned teams to manually shut down these
accounts. First of all, this mechanism is not always feasible
due to the limited manpower and since not many real users are
willing to put aside time and report the malicious activities.
Also, it cannot be done in a timely manner since it takes time
for these firms to review the reports and decide whether they
are legit or not. On the other hand, the fact that these accounts
simply return to social media using different accounts or even
migrate to other social media, makes all these efforts almost
useless. Therefore, the burden falls to automatic approaches
that can identify these malicious actors on social media.
Present work. In this work, to address the above mentioned
challenges, we aim to understand PSM accounts by (1) an-
alyzing their behavior in terms of their posted URLs, and
(2) estimate their influence by conducting experiments on a
real-world dataset from Twitter. We deploy a mathematical
technique known as “Hawkes process” [7] to quantify the
impact of PSMs on normal users and the greater Web, by
looking at their posted URLs on Twitter. Hawkes processes
are special forms of point processes and have shown promising
results in many problems that require modeling complicated
event sequences where historical events have impact on future
ones, including financial analysis [8], seismic analysis [9] and
social network modeling [10] to name a few. This study uses
an ISIS-related dataset from Twitter [11]. The dataset contains
an action log of users in the form of cascades of retweets.
In this work, we consider URLs posted by two groups of
users: (1) PSM accounts and (2) normal users. The URLs
can belong to any platform including the major social media
(e.g., facebook.com), mainstream news (e.g., nytimes.com)
and alternative news outlets (e.g., rt.com). For each group
of users, we fit a multi-dimensional Hawkes processes model
wherein each process correspond to a platform referenced in at
least one tweet. Furthermore, every process can influence all
the others including itself, which allows estimating the strength
of connections between each of the social media platforms and
news sources, in terms of how likely an event (i.e., the posted
URL) can cause subsequent events in each of the groups. In
other words, in this study we are interested to investigate
if a given URL u1 has influence on another URL u2 (i.e.,
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u1 → u2) and thus can trigger subsequent events.
Main Findings. This paper makes the following main
observations:
• Among all platforms studied here, URLs shared from
facebook.com and alternative news media contributed the
most to the dissemination of malicious information from
PSM accounts. Simply put, they had the largest impact
on making a message viral and causing the subsequent
events.
• Posts that were tweeted by the PSM accounts and con-
tained URLs from facebook.com, demonstrated more in-
fluence on the subsequent retweets containing URLs from
youtube.com, in contrary to the other way around. This
means that ultimately tweets with URLs from Facebook
will high likely end up inducing more external impulse
on YouTube than YouTube might have on Facebook.
• URLs posted by the normal users have nearly the same
impact on the subsequent events regardless of the social
media or news outlet used. This basically means that
normal users do not often prefer specific social media
or news sources over the others.
II. DATA ANALYSIS
In this section, we first explain the dataset and provide the
list of the main social media platforms and news sites used in
this study. Finally, we present our data analysis to demonstrate
the differences between PSM accounts and normal users.
A. Dataset
We collect a dataset of 2.8M ISIS related tweets/retweets
in Arabic between February 22, 2016 and May 27, 2016.
The dataset contains different fields including user ID, retweet
ID, hashtags, content, posting time. The dataset also con-
tains user profile information including name, number of
followers/followees, description, location, etc. The tweets were
collected using different ISIS-related hashtags such as #sta-
teoftheislamiccaliphate. In this dataset, about 600K tweets
have at least one URL (i.e., event) referencing one of the social
media platforms or news outlets. There are about 1.4M of
paired URLs which we denote by u1 → u2 and indicates a
retweet (with the URL u2) of the original tweet (with the URL
u1).
In this study, we are interested in investigating the impact
of the URL u1 on u2. Accordingly, the dataset contains 35K
cascades (i.e., sequences of events) of different sizes and
durations, some of which contain paired URLs in the afore-
mentioned form. After pre-processing and removing duplicate
users from cascades (those who retweet themselves multiple
times), cascades sizes (i.e. number of associated postings) vary
between 20 to 9,571 and take from 10 seconds to 95 days to
finish. The log-log distribution of cascades vs. cascade size
and the cumulative distribution of duration of cascades are
depicted in Figure 1.
The statistics of the dataset are presented in Table I. For
labeling, we check through Twitter API to examine whether
the users have been suspended (labeled as PSM) or they are
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Fig. 1. (Top) Log-log distribution of cascades vs. cascade size. (Bottom)
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Fig. 2. Total number of inactive users in each cascade.
still active (labeled as normal) [12]. According to Table I, 11%
of the users in our dataset are PSMs and others are normal. We
also depict the total number of PSM accounts that have been
suspended by Twitter in each cascade, in Figure 2. Finally,
to reiterate, we note that these accounts mostly get suspended
manually by Twitter based on reports the platform receives
from its own users1.
1https://blog.twitter.com/official/en us/a/2016/an-update-on-our-efforts-to-
combat-violent-extremism.html
TABLE I
DESCRIPTION OF THE DATASET.
Name Value
# of Cascades 35K
# of Tweets/Retweets 2.8M
PSM Normal
# of Users 64,484 536,609
# of Single URLs 104,948 536,046
# of Paired URLs 200,892 1,123,434
TABLE II
SOCIAL MEDIA PLATFORM’S TOTAL NUMBER OF PAIRED URLS OF THE
FORM u1 → u2 WITH AT LEAST ONE EVENT IN THE DATASET FOR THE
PSM AND NORMAL USERS.
Platform PSM Normal
Twitter 139,940 918,803
Facebook 878 4,017
Instagram 0 2,857
Google 163 132
Youtube 24,724 72,890
TABLE III
NEWS SOURCES’ TOTAL PAIRED URLS (u1 → u2) WITH AT LEAST ONE
EVENT IN THE DATASET FOR THE PSM AND NORMAL USERS.
News Source PSM Normal
Mainstream 0 286
Alternatives 35,187 124,449
B. Social Media Platforms and News Outlets
Twitter deploys a URL shortener technique to leave more
space for content and protect users from malicious sites2. To
obtain the original URLs, we use a URL unshortening tool3 to
obtain the original links contained in the tweets in our dataset.
We consider a number of major and well-known social me-
dia platforms including Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Google
and Youtube. About the dichotomy of mainstream and alter-
native media, it is notable to mention that most criteria for
determining whether a news source counts as either of them,
are based on a number of factors including but not limited
to the content and whether or not it is corporate owned4.
However, a key difference between these two sources of media
comes from the fact that all of mainstream media is profit-
oriented, in contrast to the alternative media. We further note
that for the most part, mainstream media is considered as
a more credible source than alternative media, although the
reputation has been recently tainted by the fake news.
In this work, following the commonsense, we consider
popular news outlets such as The New York Times, and The
Wall Street Journal as mainstream and less popular ones as
alternatives. In Table II, we summarize the total number of
paired URLs (i.e, u1 → u2) in which the original URL (i.e.,
u1) corresponds to each social media platform with at least
one event in our dataset. We also summarize in Table III, the
total number of paired URLs whose original URL belongs
to the mainstream and alternative news sources. In Table IV,
we see the break down of number of paired URLs for the
PSM and normal users. We further demonstrate in Table V
some examples of the mainstream and alternative news URLs
occurrence used in this work.
C. Temporal Analysis
Here, we present the differences between the PSM accounts
in our dataset with their counterparts, normal users through
2https://help.twitter.com/en/using-twitter/url-shortener
3https://github.com/skevas/unshorten
4https://smallbusiness.chron.com/mainstream-vs-alternative-media-
21113.html
Fig. 3. Number of paired URLs posted by the PSM and normal users in our
dataset. Note that number of normal users in our dataset is higher than the
PSM accounts.
temporal analysis of their posted URLs.
In Figure 3, we depict the daily occurrence of the paired
URLs over the span of 43 days for both PSM and normal users.
Recall from the previous section that our dataset has a larger
number of normal users and higher number of the posted URLs
compared to the PSM accounts. Therefore, it is reasonable to
observe more activity from normal users than PSMs. For both
groups of users, we observe a similar trend in occurrence of
spikes and their durations. As it is seen, distinguishing between
PSMs and normal users merely based on the occurrence of
URLs and their patterns is not reliable. Therefore, we set out
to conduct experiments using a more sophisticated statistical
technique known as “Hawkes Process” in the next section.
III. FRAMEWORK
In the previous section, we presented our data analysis to
demonstrate differences between PSM accounts and normal
users in terms of URLs they usually post on Twitter. We now
set out to assess their impact via a well-known mathematical
technique called “Hawkes process”.
A. Hawkes Processes
In many scenarios, one needs to deal with timestamped
events such as the activity of users on a social network
recorded in continuous time. An important task then is to
estimate the influence of the nodes based on their timestamp
patterns [13]. Point process is a principled framework for
modeling such event data, where the dynamic of the point
process can be captured by its conditional intensity function
as follows:
λ(t) = lim
∆t→0
E(N(t+ ∆t)−N(t)|Ht)
∆t
=
E(dN(t)|Ht)
dt
(1)
where E(dN(t)|Ht) is the expectation of the number of
events happend in the interval (t, t + dt] given the historical
observations Ht and N(t) records the number of events before
time t. Point process can be equivalently represented as a
counting process N = {N(t)|t ∈ [0, T ]} over the time interval
[0, T ].
TABLE IV
TOTAL NUMBER OF PAIRED URLS OF THE FORM u1 → u2 WITH AT LEAST ONE EVENT FOR PSM/NORMAL USERS AND FOR ALL PLATFORMS.
→ Twitter → Facebook → Instagram → Google → Youtube → Mainstream → Alternatives
Twitter → 109,354/766,617 598/3,843 229/2,461 120/382 11,992/59,889 90/688 17,557/84,923
Facebook → 655/3,108 4/41 3/9 2/1 87/281 0/1 127/576
Instagram → 0/2,362 0/11 0/25 0/2 0/161 0/2 0/294
Google → 134/74 0/0 0/1 0/0 12/53 0/0 17/4
Youtube → 14,004/56,545 132/312 23/211 22/32 6,799/7,529 13/48 3,731/8,213
Mainstream → 0/189 0/1 0/1 0/0 0/13 0/1 0/81
Alternatives → 21,047/95,641 145/767 45/318 59/64 3,862/9,199 26/122 10,003/18,338
The Hawkes process framework [7] has been used in many
problems that require modeling complicated event sequences
where historical events have impact on future ones. Exam-
ples include but are not limited to financial analysis [8],
seismic analysis [9] and social network modeling [10]. One-
dimensional Hawkes process is a point process Nt with the
following particular form of intensity function:
λ(t) = µ+ a
∫ t
−∞
g(t− s)dNs = µ+ a
∑
i:ti<t
g(t− ti) (2)
where µ > 0 is the exogenous base intensity (i.e., background
rate of events), ti are the time of events in the point process
before time t, and g(t) is the decay kernel.
In this paper, we use exponential kernel of the form
g(t) = we−wt, but adapting to the other positive forms is
straightforward. The second part of the above formulation
captures the self-exciting nature of the point processes– the
occurrence of events in the past has a positive impact on the
future ones. Given a sequence of events {ti}ni=1 observed in
[0, T ] and generated from the above intensity function, the
log-likelihood function can be obtained as follows [10]:
L = log
∏n
i=1 λ(ti)
exp
∫ T
0
λ(t)dt
=
n∑
i=1
log λ(ti)−
∫ T
0
λ(t)dt (3)
In this paper, we focus on multi-dimensional Hawkes pro-
cesses which is defined by a U -dimensional point process
Nut , u = 1, . . . , U . In other words, we have U Hawkes
processes coupled with each other– each Hawkes process
correspond to one of the platforms and the influence between
them is modeled using the mutually-exciting property of the
multi-dimensional Hawkes processes. We formally define the
following formulation to model the influence of different
events on each other:
TABLE V
EXAMPLES OF MAINSTREAM AND ALTERNATIVE NEWS.
Mainstream Alternatives
https://www.nytimes.com https://www.rt.com
https://www.reuters.com https://www.arabi21.com
https://www.wsj.com https://www.7adramout.net
https://www.nbcnews.com https://www.addiyar.com
https://www.ft.com https://zamnpress.com
Fig. 4. Illustration of the Hawkes Process. Events induce impulse on other
processes and cause child events. Background event in e0 induces impulse
on responses on processes e1 and e2.
λu(t) = µu +
∑
i:ti<t
auuig(t− ti) (4)
where µu ≥ 0 is the base intensity for the u-th Hawkes
process. The coefficient auui ≥ 0 captures the mutually-
exciting property between the u-th and ui-th processes. Larger
value of auui shows that events in the ui-th dimension are
more likely to trigger an event in u-th dimension in future.
More intuitively, an event on one point process can cause
an impulse response on other processes, which increases
the probability of an event occurring above the processes’
background rates. We reiterate that in this study each URL
is attributed to an event, i.e., if the URL u1 triggers the URL
u2 (i.e., u1 → u2), then au2u1 ≥ 0
In Figure 4, we depict a multivariate example of three
different streams of events, e0, e1 and e2. As illustrated, e0
is caused by the background rate λ(t)0 and has an influence
on itself and e1. On the other hand, e1 is caused by λ(t)1
and has an influence on e2. Simply put, a background event
in e0 induces impulse on responses on processes e1 and e2.
Accordingly, the caused child event in e1 leads to another child
event in e2.
We consider an infectivity matrix A = [auui ] ∈ RU×U
which collects the self-triggering coefficients between Hawkes
processes, and U = 7 is the number of processes (i.e.,
platforms) in our work. Each entry in this matrix indicates the
strength of influence each platform has on other platforms.
Our ultimate goal in this paper is to estimate the infectivity
matrix as it reflects the estimated influence of each platform on
others. Next, we will provide the methodology that we follow
to estimate the influence of the URLs on each other.
B. Methodology
We aim to assess the influence of the PSM accounts in
our dataset via their posted URLs. We consider the URLs
posted by two groups of users: (1) PSM accounts and (2)
normal users. For both groups, we fit a Hawkes model with
K = 7 point processes each for the seven categories of
social media and news outlets discussed earlier. In each of
the Hawkes models, every process is able to influence all the
others including itself, which allows us to estimate the strength
of connections between each of the seven categories for both
groups of users, in terms of how likely an event (i.e., the posted
URL) can cause subsequent events in each of the groups.
We use the ADM4 algorithm presented by [10] and follow
the methodology presented by [14] for fitting the Haweks
processes for both PSM and normal users. ADM4 [10] is an
efficient optimization that estimates the parameters A and µ
by maximizing the regularized log-likelihood L(A,µ):
min
A≥0,µ≥0
−L(A,µ) + λ1||A||∗ + λ2||A||1 (5)
where L(A,µ) can be obtained by substituting λu(t) from
Equation 4 into Equation 3. Also, ||A||∗ is the nuclear norm
of matrix A, and is defined as the sum of its singular value.
We consider two different sets of URLs posted by the PSM
accounts and normal users by selecting URLs that have at least
one event in Twitter (i.e., posted by a user). For each group,
we construct a matrix W ∈ NT×U with U = 7, whose entries
are sequences of events (i.e., posted URLs) observed during a
time period T . We note that each sequence of events is of the
form S = {(ti, ui)}nii=1 where ni is the number of the events
occurring at the ui-th dimension (i.e., URLs posted containing
one of the 7 platforms).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
Here, we conduct experiments to gauge the effectiveness of
Hawkes process for moderling influence of PSMs.
A. Settings
In this work, we adopt the ADM4 algorithm [10] which
implements parametric inference for Hawkes processes with
an exponential kernel and a mix of Lasso and nuclear regu-
larization. We initialize infectivity matrix A, base intensities
µ and decays β ∈ R randomly.
We further set the number of nodes U = 7 to reflect the
7 platforms used in this study. Level of penalization is set
to C = 1000, and the ratio of Lasso-Nuclear regularization
mixing parameter is set to 0.5. Finally, maximum number of
iterations for solving the optimization is set to 50 and the
tolerance of solving algorithm is set to 1e− 5.
B. Results
We estimate infectivity matrix for both PSM and normal
users by fitting the Hawkes model described earlier. In our
study, this matrix characterizes the strength of the connections
between the platforms and news sources. More specifically,
each weight value represents the connection strength from one
platform to another. In other words, each entry in this matrix
can be interpreted as the expected number of subsequent events
that will occur on the second group after each event on the
first [14]. In Figure 5, we depict the estimated weights for
all paired URLs for both PSM and normal users. Looking
at the weights in both of the plots, we realize that greater
weights belong to processes that have impact on Twitter, i.e.
“→ Twitter”. This implies that both of the groups in our
Twitter dataset often post URLs that ultimately have greater
impact on Twitter.
Overall, we observe the followings:
• URLs referencing all platforms and posted by the PSMs
and regular users, mostly trigger URLs that contain the
Twitter domain.
• Among all platforms studied here, URLs shared from
facebook.com and alternative news media contributed the
most to the dissemination of malicious information from
PSM accounts. In other words, they had largest impact
on making a message viral and causing the subsequent
events.
• Posts that were tweeted by the PSM accounts and con-
tained URLs from facebook.com, demonstrated more
influence on the subsequent retweets containing URLs
from youtube.com, in contrary to the other way around.
This means that ultimately tweets with URLs from face-
book will likely end up inducing external impulse on
youtube.com. In contrast, URLs posted by the normal
users have nearly the same impact on the subsequent
events regardless of the social media or news outlet used.
The above mentioned observations demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of leveraging Hawkes process to quantify the impact
of URLs posted by PSMs and regular users on the dissemi-
nation of content on Twitter. The observations we make here
show that PSM accounts and regular users behave differently
in terms of the URLs they post on Twitter, in that they have
different tastes while disseminating URL links. Accordingly
their impact on the subsequent events significantly differ from
each other.
V. RELATED WORK
The explosive growth of the Web has raised numerous
challenges and attracted several researchers with different
background [11], [15]–[29]. Below, we will review some of
the closest research directions to our research.
Point Process. When dealing with timestamped events in
continuous time such as the activity of users on social media,
point process could be leveraged for modeling such events.
Point processes have been extensively used to model activities
in networks [30]. Hawkes process is a special form of point
processes which models complicated event sequences with
historical events influencing future ones. Hawkes processes
have been applied to a variety of problems including financial
analysis [8], seismic analysis [9] and social network model-
ing [10], community detection [31], and causal inference [32].
Social Spam/Bot Detection. Social bot is a computer program
that automatically generate content and interacts with real
Fig. 5. Estimated weights for all paired URLs for (top) PSMs, and (bottom)
normal users. Among all URLs, those from facebook.com and alternative news
media had the largest impact on dissemination of malicious messages.
people on social media, trying to emulate and possibly alter
their behavior [15]. Recently, DARPA organized a Twitter bot
challenge to detect “influence bots” [33], where supervised
and semi-supervised approaches were proposed using different
features. The work of [34] for example, use similarity to
cluster accounts and uncover groups of malicious users. The
work of [35] presents a supervised framework for bot detection
which uses more than thousands features. In a different at-
tempt, the work of [36] studied the problem of spam detection
in Wikipedia using different spammers behavioral features. For
a comprehensive survey on the ongoing efforts to fight social
bots, we direct the reader to [15].
Fake News Identification. Fake news detection has recently
attracted a growing interest of general public and researchers,
as the spread of misinformation on social media and the Web
increases on a daily basis. A growing body of work has been
devoted to addressing the impact of bots in manipulating po-
litical discussion and spreading fake news, including the 2016
U.S. presidential election [19], [37], [38] and the 2017 French
election [39]. For example, [38] analyzes tweets following
recent U.S. presidential election and found evidences that bots
played key roles in spreading fake news.
Identifying Instigators. Given a snapshot of the diffusion
process at a given time, these works aim to detect the source
of the diffusion. For instance, [40] designed an approach
for information source detection and in particular initiator
of a cascade. In contrast, we are focused on a set of users
who might or might not be initiators. Other similar works
on finding most influential spreaders of information such as
[41], [42] and outbreak prediction such as [43] also exist
in the literature. For example, the work of [44] performed
classification to detect users who adopt popular items.
Extremism Detection. Several studies have focused on under-
standing extremism in social networks [2], [22], [28], [45]–
[48]. The work of [2], uses Twitter and proposes an approach
to predict new extremists, determine if the newly created
account belongs to a suspended extremist, and predict the
ego-network of the suspended extremist upon creating her
new account. Authors in [22], [45] performed iterative vertex
clustering and classification to identify Islamic Jihadists on
Twitter.
Detection of Internet Water Armies. The term “Internet
water armies” refers to a special group of online users who
get paid for posting comments for some hidden purposes such
as influencing other users towards social events or business
markets. Therefore, they are also called “hidden paid posters”.
The works of [5], [6], [25] use user behavioral and domain-
specific attributes and designed approaches to detect Internet
water armies.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this study, we presented an analysis on a real-world ISIS-
related dataset from Twitter to demonstrate how Pathogenic
Social Media (PSM) and normal users usually post on Twit-
ter in terms of the URLs they post. More specifically, we
leveraged a statistical technique known as Hawkes Process
for modeling the influence of PSM accounts on dissemination
of malicious content on the Web. In this work, we used
URLs posted by two groups of users, PSMs and normal users,
on major social media and mainstream and alternative news
outlets. Overall, our findings indicate that the URLs posted
by the PSM accounts have the largest impact if contained
either facebook.com or alternative news media. In contrast,
their counterparts, i.e., normal users, often post URLs that
have nearly the same impact on the Web, no matter what
social media or news outlet they use. There are potential
avenues for future work. First, we would like to extend the
study by proposing a prediction mechanism for distinguishing
PSMs from normal users, based on their different impact on
the greater Web. Another research direction would also be
learning causal inference for Hawkes process and investigating
the relation between the two concepts, while considering the
problem of identification of PSM accounts.
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